Women Are (Allegedly) People, Too by Grossman, Joanna L.
Copyright 2019 by Joanna L. Grossman Vol. 114 
Northwestern University Law Review 
149 
Symposium on Anita Bernstein’s  
The Common Law Inside the Female Body 
WOMEN ARE (ALLEGEDLY) PEOPLE, TOO 
Joanna L. Grossman* 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 149	
I.	 THE RIGHT TO FAVOR ONESELF .................................................................. 150	
II.	 THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEEK AN ABORTION ................................. 152	




Professor Anita Bernstein opens her book, The Common Law Inside the 
Female Body, with a startling “strange bedfellows” argument: William 
Blackstone and modern American feminists want the same thing. “The 
common law,” she argues “contains precepts and doctrines that strengthen 
the freedom of individuals; the feminist struggle against the subjugation of 
women pursues liberty.”1 Can this be the same Blackstone who articulated 
the doctrine of coverture and the severe impediments it imposed on the 
liberty of married women? His pronouncement that “the husband and wife 
are one person in law”—and that one is the husband—is the centerpiece of a 
doctrine that deprived married women of a panoply of civil rights like buying 
property, entering into contracts, and owning their own wages.2 These 
disabilities were lifted by statutes known as the “Married Women’s Property 
Acts,” but some impediments persisted into the twentieth century.3 But by 
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 1 ANITA BERNSTEIN, THE COMMON LAW INSIDE THE FEMALE BODY 1 (2019). 
 2 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442 (Callaghan & Co. 1899). 
 3 The disabilities of coverture were lifted in waves by states beginning around 1850. See Richard H. 
Chused, Married Women’s Property Law: 1800–1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359, 1359, 1398 (1983). The right 
to own one’s own wages was the last one secured by women. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The 
First Woman’s Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 
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the end of the book, Bernstein has made a compelling argument that common 
law principles, despite an inauspicious start, can “liberate women.”4 Indeed, 
there is little if anything in those principles that deprives women of the same 
rights as men. The common law may have “proceeded as if only men could 
enjoy its opportunities,” but that, she argues, is due to a “historical condition 
now supplanted.”5 
Once women became equal participants in civil society as well as in the 
justice system, there ceased to exist any basis for restricting the benefit of 
common-law principles to men.6 And, oh boy, the common law contains 
some juicy stuff that really could be deployed to advance the cause of gender 
equality. This Essay will consider and evaluate Bernstein’s argument that the 
common law supports a virtually unfettered right to terminate a pregnancy. 
It will situate her argument against the backdrop of the constitutional right 
of abortion, which has been the primary lens through which women’s 
reproductive rights have been viewed. The Essay will then consider the 
newly composed Supreme Court and the threat it portends to reproductive 
rights. It concludes by suggesting that the common law, as Bernstein 
understands it, could come to the rescue of women and their full humanity. 
I. THE RIGHT TO FAVOR ONESELF 
Bernstein’s overarching point is that while the common law embraces 
a belief in negative liberty that does not guarantee individuals receive 
anything “to give them the freedom to flourish,” it empowers them to “reject 
invasion and intrusion.”7 What this amounts to, in Bernstein’s words, is a 
right of “condoned self-regard.”8 She further explains: 
We may put ourselves first, in other words. Individuals may favor themselves 
and what they think are their own interests over the demands that another person 
makes. Only if they have done something that forces them to subordinate what 
they want for themselves must they yield to the wishes of another individual. In 
this design, found pervasively in the common law, condoned self-regard is the 
rule and compelled self-abnegation the exception.9 
Chapter Five is devoted to unwanted pregnancy—specifically, the 
application of indisputable common law principles to abortion. At the risk of 
 
1083 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to 
Earnings, 1860–1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2138 (1994). 
 4 BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 1. 
 5 Id. 
 6 Id. at 2. 
 7 Id. at 7. 
 8 Id. at 8. 
 9 Id. 
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causing Blackstone to turn over in his grave, let’s consider Bernstein’s 
bottom line: The common law clearly supports a woman’s unfettered access 
to abortion for no reason other than that she does not desire to be pregnant.10 
The chapter revolves around the unwanted “Zef,” her shorthand for an in 
utero zygote-embryo-fetus, a life form that changes identity as it develops 
from blastocyst to baby.11 Does a woman have the right to forcefully remove 
the Zef from her body? If the answer is no, she is forced to give birth and 
forced, unless and until she relinquishes the child for adoption, to become a 
mother. The harm of forced birth should be obvious—the pain and risk of 
pregnancy and childbirth to her life and health, the invasive medical 
monitoring, and the many costs and potential harms of becoming a mother 
against one’s will.12 The consequences of forced birth take a variety of 
forms—from precipitating intimate partner violence to costing one her job—
and can last a lifetime (or shorten it).13 Abortion, on the other hand, is safe 
and effective in most cases14—a woman is fourteen times more likely to die 
from giving birth than from having an abortion.15 The question, then, is 
whether the pregnant woman has the right to avoid this harm by terminating 
the pregnancy and evicting the Zef from the inside of her body. Without the 
protective housing of the uterus, and the biological support the pregnant 
woman provides, the Zef cannot survive. 
 
 10 See id. at 152–55. 
 11 Id. at 142–43. 
 12 Some of these harms, and their disproportionate impact on poor women and women of color, are 
explored in Joanna L. Grossman, The Seeds of Early Childhood, 71 FLA. L. REV. F. 117, 127–28 (2019); 
see also GUTTMACHER INST., UNINTENDED PREGNANCY IN THE UNITED STATES (Jan. 2019), 
https://www.guttmacher.org/fact-sheet/unintended-pregnancy-united-states [https://perma.cc/K9ER-
GR5J]. 
 13 BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 144–45. 
 14 See, e.g., NAT’L ACADS. SCI., ENG’G, & MED., THE SAFETY AND QUALITY OF ABORTION CARE IN 
THE UNITED STATES (2018), https://doi.org/10.17226/24950 [https://perma.cc/G238-U24H]; PLANNED 
PARENTHOOD, How Safe Is the Abortion Pill?, https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/abortion/the-
abortion-pill/how-safe-is-the-abortion-pill [https://perma.cc/28TA-XT8K] (“Medication abortion is very 
safe. Serious problems are rare, but like all medical procedures, there can be some risks.”). Safety and 
legality are highly interrelated. See Bela Ganatra et al., Global, Regional, and Subregional Classification 
of Abortions by Safety, 2010–14: Estimates from a Bayesian Hierarchical Model, 390 LANCET 2372, 
2372 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1016/S0140-6736(17)31794-4 [https://perma.cc/Y7FL-9XX6] 
(concluding that abortion is performed safely in nine out of ten cases in countries where it is legal, but 
only one out of four cases where it is banned or severely restricted). 
 15 BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 144; see also Elizabeth G. Raymond & David A. Grimes, The 
Comparative Safety of Legal Induced Abortion and Childbirth in the United States, 119 OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY 215, 217 (2012); Warren M. Hern, Opinion, Pregnancy Kills. Abortion Saves Lives., N.Y. 
TIMES (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/opinion/alabama-law-abortion.html 
[https://perma.cc/BPQ6-HD4H]. 
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II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO SEEK AN ABORTION 
The Constitution has been the primary framework through which 
abortion rights have been developed in the U.S. Since 1973, when the 
Supreme Court decided in Roe v. Wade16 that a woman has the right to 
terminate a pre-viability pregnancy, most debates about abortion have hung 
on Roe and its ability to withstand relentless attacks in the courts. At the time 
Roe was decided, abortion was criminalized by a majority of U.S. states.17 
Those bans were not age-old. Many were enacted in the middle of the 
nineteenth century, replacing a common law standard followed both in 
England and in U.S. states that permitted abortions before “quickening”—
the moment when the pregnant woman can first feel fetal movement (around 
sixteen to eighteen weeks gestation).18 The criminal bans that took hold 
typically prohibited all abortions, but punished those on farther along 
pregnancies more severely than earlier ones; the only standard exception was 
for abortions necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.19 And under 
these laws, it was the doctors who were criminalized, not the pregnant 
women.20 
A move to liberalize abortion laws had begun prior to the decision in 
Roe. In 1962, the American Law Institute recommended that states loosen 
abortion restrictions by creating a category of justifiable abortions.21 
Between 1966 and 1972, a third of the states changed their laws to create at 
least a small category for legal abortion.22 When Roe was decided, four states 
had repealed their bans completely.23 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Blackmun declared that the right to privacy under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause encompassed the right to terminate a 
 
 16 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973). 
 17 Id. at 118. 
 18 JANET FARRELL BRODIE, CONTRACEPTION AND ABORTION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 
253–54 (1994); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA: THE ORIGINS AND EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL 
POLICY 8 (1978). 
 19 ROSEMARY NOSSIFF, BEFORE ROE: ABORTION POLICY IN THE STATES 31–33 (2001). 
 20 On this complex history of abortion and punishment, see Mary Ziegler, Some Form of Punishment: 
Penalizing Women for Abortion, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 735, 740 (2018) (noting that although 
some laws technically permitted pregnant women to be prosecuted for soliciting or conspiring with the 
abortion provider, “few women went to prison for having an abortion”). 
 21 Model Penal Code § 230.3 (AM. LAW INST. 1962); Roe, 410 U.S. at 139–40; see also LESLIE J. 
REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–
1973, at 220–22 (1997). 
 22 Roe, 410 U.S. at 139–40. 
 23 See id. at 140 n.37 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 11.15.060 (1970); HAW. REV. STAT. § 453-16 (Supp. 
1971); N.Y. PENAL L. § 125.05, subd. 3 (McKinney Supp. 1972–1973); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 9.02.060 
to 9.02.080 (Supp. 1972)); see also NOSSIFF, supra note 19, at 41. 
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pregnancy before a certain point.24 The Court held specifically that a fetus is 
not a person for constitutional purposes and does not have rights that need to 
be balanced against the woman’s own rights.25 The state, according to the 
Court, has no interest in protecting fetal life during the first trimester, but 
acquires one when the fetus reaches viability.26 This ruling effectively 
invalidated most abortion laws in the United States, even in states that had 
liberalized their laws, but fell short of legalizing abortion regardless of 
circumstance. 
In the decades that followed Roe, the Supreme Court revisited and 
reframed the right of abortion as the right to terminate a pre-viability 
pregnancy without undue burden from the government.27 The anti-abortion 
movement went through different strategies—violence, attacks on funding, 
and indirect attacks on providers and facilities that made it hard for many 
women to access abortions.28 There were wins and losses for each side—for 
example, the Supreme Court upheld restrictions on government funding for 
abortions but invalidated many regulations that forced clinics to close with 
no offsetting benefit to women’s health.29 Throughout decades of battle, 
abortion rights remained entirely contingent on the Supreme Court’s 
willingness to toe the line. 
Today, constitutional abortion rights hang by a thread, as newly 
appointed Justices Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh portend a stark 
 
 24 Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65. 
 25 Id. at 158 (“[T]he word ‘person,’ as used in the Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the 
unborn.”). 
 26 Id. at 163–64. 
 27 See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1313 (1994) (considering 
the constitutionality of a wide range of abortion restrictions). For a comprehensive history, see MARY 
ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015). 
 28 On clinic violence, see Mireille Jacobson & Heather Royer, Aftershocks: The Impact of Clinic 
Violence on Abortion Services (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16603, 2010), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w16603 [https://perma.cc/VE6L-YP7V] (noting that between 1973 and 
2003, abortion providers in the United States were the targets of over 300 acts of extreme violence, 
including arson, bombings, murders, and butyric acid attacks); David A. Grimes et al., An Epidemic of 
Antiabortion Violence in the United States, 165 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 1263 (1991), 
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/000293789190346S?via%3Dihub 
[https://perma.cc/6C4S-VD27] (noting that during the study period, 1977–1988, the National Abortion 
Federation reported the following violent acts against clinics: 222 clinic invasions, 220 acts of clinic 
vandalism, 216 bomb threats, 65 death threats, 46 assault and batteries, 20 burglaries, and 2 kidnappings). 
On the shift toward indirect regulation and funding cuts, see Mary Ziegler, After Life: Governmental 
Interests and the New Antiabortion Incrementalism, 73 U. MIAMI L. REV. 78, 85–86 (2018). 
 29 See, e.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016) (striking down two 
provisions of a Texas law that imposed an undue burden on the right to abortion by forcing clinics to 
close); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 311 (1980) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the Hyde 
Amendment, which withdrew federal funding even for “medically necessary abortions”). 
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rightward shift.30 This has created opportunities for states to restrict 
abortion—multiple states have passed near or total bans in the last few 
months in the hopes of bringing about a post-Roe world.31 But at the same 
time, other states have done the exact opposite—they have passed strong 
statutory protections for abortions that will maintain or even expand 
women’s reproductive rights when and if the constitutional bottom falls 
out.32 The question is not whether abortion rights will be protected, but when, 
how severely, and by what means they will be curtailed, at least as a 
constitutional matter. The records of the new Justices on sexual and 
reproductive rights support this prediction.33 The battle over abortion has 
become more divisive, and the polar movements have drifted further apart. 
 
 30 See, e.g., Mark Berman, Trump Promised Judges Who Would Overturn Roe v. Wade, WASH. POST 
(Mar. 21, 2017, 9:02 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2017/live-updates/trump-white-
house/neil-gorsuch-confirmation-hearings-updates-and-analysis-on-the-supreme-court-nominee/trump-
promised-judges-who-would-overturn-roe-v-wade [https://perma.cc/6YLB-Y8NM]; Mark Joseph Stern, 
Brett Kavanaugh Just Declared War on Roe v. Wade, SLATE (Feb. 7, 2019, 11:15 PM), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2019/02/brett-kavanaugh-june-medical-services-louisiana-john-
roberts.html [https://perma.cc/Q5G6-KTJL]. 
 31 See, e.g., Michelle Goldberg, Opinion, The Abortion Divide Gets Deeper, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/opinion/abortion-heartbeat-ban-georgia.html 
[https://perma.cc/LPT6-8AS9]; Sabrina Tavernise, ‘The Time Is Now’: States are Rushing to Restrict 
Abortion, or to Protect It, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/15/us/abortion-laws-2019.html [https://perma.cc/AY34-2FR8]. 
 32 See Quoctrung Bui et al., Where Roe v. Wade Has the Biggest Effect, N.Y. TIMES (July 18, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/07/18/upshot/roe-v-wade-abortion-maps-planned-
parenthood.html [https://perma.cc/VG8P-8DXR] (noting that West Coast and Northeastern states would 
still protect abortion without Roe). 
 33 Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion in the lower court opinion in Hobby Lobby, in which 
he argued for a position that would have permitted even greater incursions into the contraceptive mandate 
than ultimately permitted by the Supreme Court. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 723 F.3d 1114, 
1156–57 (10th Cir. 2013) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). As a D.C. Circuit judge, Justice Kavanaugh issued a 
decision that would have permitted the federal government to obstruct a detained immigrant minor’s 
access to abortion even after a Texas court had granted her permission to proceed. He was reversed by 
the D.C. Circuit en banc. Garza v. Hargan, 874 F.3d 735, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (en banc); see also Dahlia 
Lithwick & Jed Shugerman, Kavanaugh Already Has One of the Clearest Records Against Roe of Any 
Recent Supreme Court Nominee, SLATE (July 18, 2018, 2:43 PM), https://slate.com/news-and-
politics/2018/07/brett-kavanaugh-has-a-clear-record-against-roe-v-wade.html [https://perma.cc/9SD7-
EADB] (outlining and discussing Justice Kavanaugh’s prior decisions in cases that implicated Roe v. 
Wade). In June Medical Services, L.L.C. v. Gee, Justice Kavanaugh dissented from an order staying 
enforcement of a set of abortion restrictions in Louisiana pending review on the merits and, in an unusual 
move, wrote a dissenting opinion. 139 S. Ct. 663 (2019) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (order granting stay). 
Even though the restrictions are virtually identical to those struck down by the Supreme Court in 2016 in 
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstadt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016), Justice Kavanaugh would have permitted 
the restrictions to take effect pending review, despite significant evidence in the record that the restrictions 
would cause all but one doctor in the State of Louisiana to cease providing abortion care. This action was 
widely understood as Justice Kavanaugh’s declaration of war on abortion rights. See, e.g., Stern, supra 
note 30. The Supreme Court has just agreed to review the Fifth Circuit’s ruling in June Medical. June 
Med. Servs. L.L.C. v. Gee, 905 F.3d 787 (5th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 140 S. Ct. 35 (2019) (consolidating 
cases). 
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The shifting terrain presents new challenges, making it the perfect time to 
consider Bernstein’s call of the common law to arms. 
III. THE ROLE OF THE COMMON LAW IN PROTECTING ABORTION RIGHTS 
From the perspective of a pregnant woman, an unwanted pregnancy 
causes harm, and termination of that pregnancy can be accomplished safely 
and effectively. Those are the (entirely provable) premises from which 
Bernstein begins her argument that the common law protects a woman’s 
right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy.34 Remaining pregnant is worth the 
immense physical, emotional, financial, and social costs “only if one wishes 
the first-time parenthood or the larger family that will follow this 
pregnancy—or, for the minority of pregnancies that involve surrogacy, if the 
pregnant person is receiving acceptable compensation.”35 The Supreme 
Court has recognized that the deprivation of access to abortion “amounts to 
a real injury,”36 but does the common law? 
The common law, Bernstein argues, protects a general right to refuse 
the things we “Do Not Want.”37 There are exceptions to this rule—consent, 
undertaking of responsibility, and criminal punishment—but Bernstein 
argues persuasively that none are applicable to the condition of unwanted 
pregnancy.38 Engaging in sex, she argues, cannot be equated with consent to 
pregnancy, given the possibility of rape, failed contraceptives, fraud about 
contraceptives or fertility, as well as the sheer unlikelihood that any one act 
of sex will so result. Likewise, for the same reason, a pregnant woman cannot 
be treated as having undertaken responsibility for the Zef, at least not in all 
circumstances. Moreover, the common law provides that “an obligor may 
abandon an undertaking when fulfilling it would demand too much of her.”39 
Pregnancy and birth surely fit that bill. Pregnancy can trigger or reveal life-
altering or life-threatening situations that would make even a stoic wish to 
abandon course.40 The final possibility is that she must remain pregnant as a 
form of criminal punishment, but the status of being pregnant does not itself 
prove a sufficient act or mental state to warrant criminal liability, and in most 
cases, the underlying sex is not a crime. And even if it was, Bernstein 
explains, “[f]orced gestation, parturition, and motherhood are incoherent 
 
 34 BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 143–47. 
 35 Id. at 147. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 33–35. 
 38 Id. at 147–50. 
 39 Id. at 149. 
 40 See, e.g., supra notes 11–15 and accompanying text. 
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retribution for whatever misconduct the pregnancy is understood to 
manifest.”41 
If the woman’s right to refuse things she Does Not Want is intact, then 
the remaining question is: with what means? In other words, can she enforce 
her right to refuse something she Does Not Want by terminating the Zef? It 
does not even seem like a close call under standard common law principles, 
and here’s the punchline: of course she can. Bernstein explains thoroughly 
why the common law precept that permits one to repel an invader with deadly 
force supports unfettered access to abortion.42 The principle gives people an 
“interest in the integrity and safety of not only their lives and health but also 
the physical space in which they live.”43 As already discussed, the Zef poses 
a serious risk of bodily harm, which is sufficient under the common law 
standard to justify a lethal response. This is so even when the target of the 
force bears no blame for the invasion (the Zef), and when the response is 
carried out by someone other than the one threatened (the medical provider). 
The “castle doctrine,” which permits a person to take severe measures to 
protect her home from an invader, only reinforces the common law’s support 
for abortion to repel an invading Zef.44 It is not an exaggeration to say that 
most readers will be completely convinced by the end of this section of the 
book that the common law supports a right to abortion far broader than the 
Constitution guarantees. And that this would be true whether you believe the 
Zef to be a person or not. After all, how could it be that a person can kill a 
living, breathing, fully grown human to protect his home, but another person 
cannot protect her own body from an unwanted invader? 
Bernstein further examines a second precept of the common law—that 
a person may “withhold benevolence and favors” from others, even when 
they would require little effort and pose no risk.45 As anyone who has 
completed first-year Torts will remember, there is no duty to rescue another 
person. You can discover a helpless baby on the train tracks and just leave it 
there, potential lethal harm be damned.46 
This all invites Bernstein’s observation: “If Ye Olde Common Law 
gives individuals a right to rid themselves of pregnancy, one would have 
expected to hear the news before now.”47 While the common law has 
 
 41 BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 150. 
 42 Id. at 151–56. 
 43 Id. at 151. 
 44 See id. at 152–53. 
 45 Id. at 156–60. 
 46 On the lack of a duty to rescue under tort law, see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 
90 YALE L.J. 247, 247 (1980). 
 47 BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 160. 
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“consistently had no trouble” recognizing the right of people to repel 
intruders or withhold favors, “it has been less able to perceive a pregnant 
individual as a holder of these common law rights.”48 Bernstein explains that 
this is, in part, a reflection of science and technology: before safe and 
effective methods of abortion were perfected, which did not happen until the 
twentieth century, an abortion prohibition could have been justified under 
the common law as a sort of “harm reduction” principle.49 This, she points 
out, was the focus of early feminists who opposed abortion and whose views 
have been twisted and co-opted by the modern anti-abortion movement.50 
The more concerning explanation for the lack of recognition of the 
common law’s application to abortion, which Bernstein captures in a single 
sentence, is this: “Applying common law doctrines to abortion calls for 
willingness to consider the pregnant person a person.”51 Therein lies the rub. 
This is a general problem with the law, especially when it comes to sexual 
and reproductive health. The law is replete with instances in which the failure 
to recognize women’s full humanity relegates them to second-class citizens. 
One need only skim modern abortion case law to see that even when courts 
purport to be protecting a woman’s right to abortion, they do not treat her as 
a functioning, independent person—and certainly not as one who possesses 
the long-recognized right to repel invaders. The Supreme Court has upheld 
a wide variety of abortion restrictions that question a woman’s power to 
make decisions about her own body and healthcare, including mandatory 
ultrasounds, waiting periods, counseling with scientific misinformation, and 
so on.52 
In perhaps the most egregious example, the Supreme Court upheld a 
federal ban on a particular method of second-trimester abortions in order to 
 
 48 Id. at 160–61. 
 49 Id. at 165. 
 50 Id. The Susan B. Anthony List, for example, is a pro-life advocacy group that operates under the 
name of a famous feminist and suffragist, even though many historians believe this is a misappropriation 
of women’s history and a misrepresentation of Anthony’s position on abortion. See SUSAN B. ANTHONY 
LIST, https://www.sba-list.org [https://perma.cc/AL4S-UV7X]; see also Tracy A. Thomas, 
Misappropriating Women’s History in the Law and Politics of Abortion, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 2 
(2012); Craig Medred, ‘Sarah Palin Is No Susan B. Anthony’, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS (July 6, 2016), 
https://www.adn.com/politics/article/sarah-palin-no-susan-b-anthony/2010/05/18 
[https://perma.cc/J5KK-5HEP] (describing a blog post, on a now-defunct blog, in which Ann Gordon and 
Lynn Sherr argue that the pro-life movement has distorted Anthony’s attitudes toward abortion to “bolster 
[its] own cause”). 
 51 BERNSTEIN, supra note 1, at 161. 
 52 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 1313 (1994). 
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protect women from their own regret (assumed, not proven).53 As Justice 
Kennedy wrote,  
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must 
struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she learns, 
only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a doctor to 
pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her unborn child, a 
child assuming the human form.54  
According to the Court, the woman here is a mother (without having 
given birth), she is bonded to an unborn child, and she is suffering.55 
Abortions seem only, in the eyes of the Supreme Court, to involve the 
“abortion doctor,” “the fetus,” and “the cervix.”56 There is no fully human 
woman at the center, where she should be. Imagine what self-defense 
criminal cases would look like if we described men in such terms when they 
shoot an intruder who has dared penetrate their castle? Don’t bother, because 
judges never do. We do not deprive a man of his self-defense argument out 
of fear that he might regret or feel conflicted about shooting an unarmed, 
potentially harmless intruder. We just envision him standing up for his 
rights—strong, fearless, determined, and unfazed by the moral complexity 
of his act. 
CONCLUSION 
Will the common law come to the rescue of women as the Supreme 
Court falls away from them and their rights? One limitation of the common 
law, which Bernstein acknowledges, is that it can be abrogated by statute. It 
is thus not a force against the legislatures that have already demonstrated 
their antipathy to abortion rights and their plans for a post-Roe world. And 
perhaps it adds nothing in the states that have taken the initiative to use 
legislative power to protect and expand reproductive rights. The 
constitutional protection for a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy has 
been the glue that keeps the opposing states from drifting too far away. The 
right to abortion cannot, of course, be abrogated by statute, state or federal. 
 
 53 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (“While we find no reliable data to measure 
the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to regret their choice to abort 
the infant life they once created and sustained.”). 
 54 Id. at 159–60. 
 55 On this treatment of women in abortion law, see Joanna L. Grossman & Linda McClain, Gonzales 
v. Carhart: How the Supreme Court’s Validation of the Federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act Affects 




 56 Id.; see also Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 124. 
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But it can be abandoned by the Supreme Court, and it may well be in the 
near future. While it is not clear that the common law will be the backstop 
when this happens, it could be used to focus our attention on the most 
important question: Are women people, too? 
